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ABSTRACT 
 
Edward Snowden became a household name on June 5, 
2013, when he leaked highly classified documents revealing 
that the American Government was spying on its citizens. 
The information exposed that the National Security Agency 
(NSA) collected millions of American’s metadata through 
forced cooperation with telephone-service providers. 
Metadata contains sensitive and private information about 
a person’s life. When collected and searched, metadata can 
reveal a portrait of a person’s intimate activities amounting 
to a violation of one’s reasonable expectation of privacy. 
This Article suggests changing the current standard 
allowing the NSA to collect and search metadata under 
Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act. The threshold 
needed to obtain and search a person’s metadata should be 
raised from the current standard of reasonable and 
articulable suspicion to a higher burden of probable cause. 
Since Mr. Snowden’s unauthorized disclosure, there has 
been public outcry regarding metadata collection. In 
response, President Obama issued a Public Policy 
Directive limiting the scope of metadata that the NSA can 
collect. Additionally, Congress has proposed legislation 
changing how the NSA collects, stores, and searches 
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metadata. The bills, however, keep intact the minimum 
reasonable and articulable standard necessary to search 
metadata.  
The breadth of information that can be gleaned from 
metadata makes it intrusive and subjects it to the Fourth 
Amendment. Yet gathering and searching metadata can be 
a valuable tool in the fight against terrorism and protecting 
American citizens from future attacks. Requiring the 
threshold to be raised to a probable cause determination 
adequately balances privacy interests against national 
security interests. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
“Metadata is what allows an actual enumerated 
understanding, a precise record of all the private 
activities in all of our lives. It shows our 
associations, our political affiliations and our actual 
activities.”1 
1 Edward Snowden, Remarks at the Amnesty International USA Annual 
General Meeting (Apr. 5, 2014); see Karl Plume, Snowden, Greenwald urge 
caution of wider government monitoring at Amnesty event, REUTERS (Apr. 5, 
2014, 8:29 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/06/us-usa-security-
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On June 5, 2013, Edward Snowden shocked the world when he 
revealed highly classified National Security Agency (NSA) 
documents to The Guardian, a British daily newspaper.2 These 
documents exposed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court’s 
(FISC) secret order instructing Verizon to collect metadata from all 
telephone calls within the United States and abroad.3 Snowden 
disclosed that the NSA was spying on American citizens through 
the mass collection of “telephony metadata,” with Congressional 
and Presidential authorization.4 Immediately thereafter, President 
Obama and Senator Diane Feinstein began downplaying the 
Orwellian nature of the program, notably justifying it by stating: 
“it’s just metadata.”5  
However, the mass collection of metadata was troubling to 
many Americans because the NSA was not only spying on those 
believed to be associated with Al-Qaida but also on messages 
between Americans without ties to suspected terrorism.6 Even 
snowden-idUSBREA3500320140406. 
2 Glenn Greenwald, NSA collecting phone records of millions of Verizon 
customers daily, THE GUARDIAN (June 5, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/ 
world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order. 
3 Marjorie Cohn, NSA Metadata Collection: Fourth Amendment Violation, 
JURIST (Jan. 15, 2014), http://jurist.org/forum/2014/01/marjorie-cohn-nsa-
metadata.php; Administration White Paper, Bulk Collection of Telephony 
Metadata Under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act 1–2 (Aug. 9, 2013), 
available at http://op.bna.com/der.nsf/id/sbay-9aeu73/. 
4 In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible 
Things From [REDACTED], No. BR 13–80, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147002 
(FISA Ct. Apr. 25, 2013) [hereinafter Primary Order]; Greenwald, supra note 2. 
5 President Obama, Remarks by the President on Review of Signals 
Intelligence (Jan. 17, 2014), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
the-press-office/2014/01/17/remarks-president-review-signals-intelligence 
[hereinafter President Obama’s Remarks]; Transcript: Diane Feinstein, Saxby 
Chambliss, Explain, Defend NSA Phone Records Program, WASH. POST (June 
6, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2013/06/06/ 
transcript-dianne-feinstein-saxby-chambliss-explain-defend-nsa-phone-records-
program [hereinafter Senator Feinstein’s Remarks]; see, e.g., ALDOUS HUXLEY, 
BRAVE NEW WORLD (1932); GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM (1945); GEORGE 
ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR (1949). These books popularized the concept 
that would come to be known as “Orwellian”, which describes manipulation of 
citizens by a totalitarian government by use of secret surveillance. 
6 Id.; James Ball, NSA Monitored calls of 35 world leaders after US official 
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more disturbing was the massive amount of sensitive and personal 
information that could be gathered from metadata in and of itself.7 
As metadata became defined in the public sphere, it became clear 
to Americans and human rights organizations alike that it’s not just 
metadata. 
The NSA’s sweeping surveillance was legalized when 
Congress passed the USA PATRIOT Act, arguably the most 
expansive piece of legislation in America’s history.8 Post-9/11, the 
USA PATRIOT Act allowed the government to use surveillance 
and technology more aggressively than ever before in an attempt to 
prevent future attacks.9 
Congress originally authorized metadata collection under 
Section 215 of the Act.10 Section 215 was amended in the USA 
PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, which 
required the government to provide “a statement of facts showing 
that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the tangible 
objects sought are relevant . . . against international terrorism . . . 
.”11 Section 215 expanded the government’s ability to compel the 
handed over contacts, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 24, 2013), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/24/nsa-surveillance-world-leaders-
calls; see Josh Levs & Catherine E. Shoichet, Europe furious, ‘shocked’ by 
report of U.S. spying, CNN.COM, (July 1, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/ 
30/world/europe/eu-nsa (explaining that European officials are shocked and 
outraged by the reports Snowden leaked that the NSA is spying on European 
Union leaders). 
7 See infra Part IV. 
8 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT 
Act), 107 Pub. L. No. 56, § 215, 115 Stat. 272, 287–88 (2001) (codified in 
scattered titles of U.S.C.); Drew Fennell, The USA PATRIOT Act: Can we be 
Both Safe and Free?, 21 DEL. LAW. 10, 10 (2003) (“On October 25, 2001, a 
matter of weeks after September 11, the U.S. Congress passed the USA 
PATRIOT Act, a bill that contains the most sweeping and comprehensive 
changes in domestic law enforcement in history . . . .”). 
9 Richard A. Clarke et al., THE PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GROUP ON 
INTELLIGENCE AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES, LIBERTY AND SECURITY 
IN A CHANGING WORLD 73 (Dec. 12, 2013) [hereinafter PRESIDENT’S REVIEW 
GROUP REPORT]. 
10 USA PATRIOT Act § 215. 
11 USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, 120 Stat. 
196 § 106 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(A)). 
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production of “any tangible things including books, records, 
papers, documents, and other items.”12 
Under this expanded program, the government began collecting 
United States citizens’ call records without warrants. This program 
is unprecedented because it targeted not only phone calls made to 
suspects living outside of the country but call records between 
American citizens themselves. The government systematically 
collected and searched sensitive information on its own citizens 
without meeting the constitutional constraints of the Fourth 
Amendment. In most cases, the Fourth Amendment imposes a 
warrant requirement to perform a search.13 Prior to performing a 
search on a constitutionally protected area, a person must first have 
probable cause and then obtain a warrant from a judge.14 The 
government’s failure to obtain a warrant before searching a 
person’s metadata records violates that person’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy.15 Even though government officials, 
including President Obama, have reassured American citizens that 
they are not listening to the content of their calls, the metadata of 
these calls can still reveal an illuminating look at the callers’ 
private lives. 
For example, consider Person X, an American citizen born in 
the United States. Person X is a college-educated, 26-year-old 
program developer who just began law school. He has no 
association to terrorist activity. Yet every day the NSA collects his 
phone records and stores all of his metadata in a database waiting 
to be queried. 
Imagine one day the NSA suspects that Person X is associated 
with a terrorist organization. Every phone number he has contacted 
within the past five years is collected. The information the 
government could collect about Person X based solely on his 
metadata displays detailed information about his life: the abortion 
clinic he called in college after an accident with his girlfriend, his 
pastor and religious affiliation, his therapist, his association with 
the National Rifle Association, the presence of bill collectors, a 
12 PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GROUP REPORT, supra note 9, at 81. 
13 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
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clinic that treats sexually transmitted diseases, or the pizza 
restaurant down the street from his house from which he orders. 
Suddenly, what seems like an innocent and harmless amount of 
“metadata,” coupled with simple investigation, becomes an 
intimate look into the personal life of Person X. The government 
has no right to this level of private information about a person, 
absent a warrant as required by the Fourth Amendment. Yet the 
government collects this data on U.S. citizens on a daily basis. 
Part I of this Article provides an in-depth background of the 
development of the right to privacy with respect to modern 
technology and surveillance. Part II discusses the history that led to 
the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, particularly Section 215, 
which authorizes metadata collection. Part III discusses current 
challenges to the metadata collection program. Part IV argues that 
the threshold to search metadata under Section 215 should be 
raised from a reasonable articulable suspicion of terrorist activity 
to the higher standard of probable cause. 
 
I. THE HISTORY OF MODERN SURVEILLANCE DEVELOPED UNDER 
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
 
Modern surveillance can be traced to the Cold War era; 
specifically, to the Vietnam War.16 Former Presidents Lyndon 
Johnson and Richard Nixon encouraged expansive surveillance of 
individuals and organizations opposed to the war.17 As a result, the 
CIA began monitoring antiwar activists.18 In the 1950s, FBI 
Director J. Edgar Hoover conducted a massive counter-intelligence 
program, known as COINTELPRO.19 Under the guise of fighting 
communism, the government engaged in surveillance, infiltration, 
dissemination of false information, and abuse of the criminal 
justice system.20 In the 1970s, a series of congressional committees 
16 PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GROUP REPORT, supra note 9, at 54. 
17 Id. at 54–55. 
18 Id. 
19 Natsu Taylor Saito, Whose Liberty? Whose Security? The USA PATRIOT 
Act in the Context of COINTELPRO and the Unlawful Repression of Political 
Dissent, 81 OR. L. REV. 1051, 1080–88 (2002). 
20 Id. 
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convened to discuss what led to the abuses that had taken place 
under COINTELPRO during the previous decades.21  
The final report, containing 96 policy recommendations, was 
prepared by the Church Committee, named after Chairman Senator 
Frank Church.22 The Church Committee Report concluded that 
spying endangers both the security of the nation and the rights of 
Americans.23 In 1976, President Gerald Ford formally prohibited 
the CIA from using surveillance measures on American citizens 
unless explicitly approved by the Attorney General.24 The use of 
electronic surveillance for national security purposes became a 
growing concern, culminating in a series of privacy cases.25 These 
cases governed the way courts have viewed electronic data for 
more than 40 years.26 
 
A.  The Court’s Development of a Right to Privacy in  
Emerging Technology 
 
Three Supreme Court cases have helped shape the right to 
privacy in light of emerging technological advancements.27 The 
invention of electronic devices led to the discovery of how to 
eavesdrop on communications that use these devices. The police 
turned to wiretapping to monitor otherwise private conversations in 
21 Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations 
with Respect to Intelligence Activities of the United States Senate, 94th Cong. 
(1976) [hereinafter Church Committee Report]. 
22 Nicholas C. Dranias, The Patriot Act of 2001 versus the 1976 Church 
Committee Report: An Unavoidable Clash of Fundamental Policy Judgments, 
17 C.B.A. REC. 28, 29 (2003). 
23 Id. at 30. 
24 Exec. Order No. 11905, United States Foreign Intelligence Activities, 41 
Fed. Reg. 7703 (Feb. 18, 1976). 
25 See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928), overruled 
by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 
U.S. 41 (1967); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Miller v. United 
States, 425 U.S. 435 (1976); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979); United 
States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
26 See, e.g., Olmstead, 227 U.S. at 478; Katz, 389 U.S. 347; Miller, 425 U.S. 
435; Smith, 442 U.S. 735; Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (cases cited range from 1928 to 
2012). 
27 See Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438; Katz, 389 U.S. 347; Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945. 
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order to collect evidence against suspected criminals. Those people 
whose conversations were overheard challenged the collection of 
such data, and the debate over privacy rights through electronic 
communications began. Olmstead v. United States, Katz v. United 
States, and United States v. Jones all involve electronic 
surveillance and the right to privacy under the Fourth 
Amendment.28 
 
1. Olmstead v. United States: Establishing Privacy as a 
Trespassory Doctrine 
 
In Olmstead, federal agents installed wiretaps on phone lines to 
investigate a conspiracy to distribute alcohol during the 
Prohibition.29 The agents tapped phone lines leading into the 
suspects’ houses and offices without actually entering the 
premises.30 They gathered evidence for five months and recorded 
multiple conversations.31 The Supreme Court held that a wiretap 
was not a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment 
because there was not a physical trespass onto real property.32 This 
holding paved the way for the trespassory/non-trespassory 
distinction regarding invasions into constitutionally protected 
areas.33 However, as people increasingly relied on the telephone 
for conducting their private affairs, Olmstead’s reasoning became 
more difficult to maintain.34 
Indeed, Justice Louis Brandeis’ dissent in Olmstead has 
become the flagship of privacy rights arguments in post-Olmstead 
cases.35 Justice Brandeis disagreed with the majority’s distinction 
28 Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438; Katz, 389 U.S. 347; Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945. 
29 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 455–58 (describing the factual background of the 
case). 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 471 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
32 Id. at 466. 
33 Lon A. Berk, After Jones, The Deluge: The Fourth Amendment’s 
Treatment of Information, Big Data and the Cloud, 14 J. HIGH TECH. L. 1, 12 
(2014). 
34 Id. at 13. 
35 Neil M. Richards, The Puzzle of Brandeis, Privacy, and Speech, 63 
VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1296 (2010). 
                                                                                                             
9
Atkins: Spying on Americans: At What Point Does the NSA's Collection and
Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2014
60 WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS [VOL. 10:1 
between trespassory and non-trespassory invasions.36 He stated 
that unjustified searches and seizures violate the Fourth 
Amendment no matter how the information was gathered.37 The 
principles set forth in the majority, Brandeis reasoned, go to the 
very nature of “constitutional liberty and security” and apply to all 
invasions by the government.38 What violates a person’s personal 
liberty is not the actual rummaging of drawers, but the “invasion of 
his indefeasible right of personal security,” Brandeis wrote.39 In 
comparing wiretapping to mail tampering, Brandeis thought that 
the invasion of the telephone was far worse.40 When a telephone 
line is tapped, confidential conversations are heard and privacy is 
violated at both ends of the line.41 
 
2. Katz v. United States: Overruling Olmstead and Paving the 
Way toward Non-Trespassory Privacy Rights 
 
In 1967 the Supreme Court finally adopted a different test for 
determining whether a search was reasonable, relying principally 
on the Brandeis dissent in Olmstead.42 In Katz v. United States, 
Katz was a bookmaker who used a telephone booth to transmit 
wagering information across state lines.43 Federal agents used an 
electronic listening device outside of the telephone booth and 
obtained recordings of the calls.44 The recordings were used at trial 
to convict Katz.45 On appeal, the government based its argument 
on the trespassory view of the Fourth Amendment, noting that the 
agents were outside of the phone booth and not within a 
36 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 477–78 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
37 Id. (“Unjustified search and seizure violates the Fourth Amendment, 
whatever the character of the paper; whether the paper when taken by the federal 
officers was in the home, in an office, or elsewhere; whether the taking was 
effected by force, by fraud, or in the orderly process of a court's procedure.”). 
38 Id. at 474 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616). 
39 Id. at 475 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616). 
40 Id. at 475. 
41 Id. 
42 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). 
43 Id. at 348. 
44 Id. at 348–54. 
45 Id. at 348. 
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constitutionally protected area.46 
The Supreme Court rejected this argument and overruled the 
literal interpretation of Olmstead, recognizing that the Fourth 
Amendment “protects people not places.”47 Specifically, the Court 
stated that telephone technology had become “vital” to private 
communications and rejected the argument that the use of a 
telephone was analogous to a broadcast of one’s voice into public 
areas.48 The Justices reasoned that the Fourth Amendment protects 
people, not simply areas, and a violation of the Fourth Amendment 
cannot turn on the presence or absence of a physical intrusion.49 
Justice John Harlan’s concurrence built upon the framework set 
forth in the majority opinion.50 He formulated the “reasonable 
expectation” test for determining whether government activity 
constitutes a violation of the Fourth Amendment.51 The two-prong 
test requires that (1) the individual has an actual (subjective) 
expectation to privacy, and (2) the expectation is one society is 
prepared to recognize as “reasonable.”52 If both prongs are 
satisfied, there is a reasonable expectation of privacy.53 Harlan’s 
test, and not the majority opinion, was adopted in Smith v. 
Maryland and is the test now used to determine whether a search 
has taken place.54 
 
3. United States v. Jones: Foreshadowing Modern Non-
Trespassory Privacy Concerns 
 
In 2010 the Supreme Court unanimously held that tracking a 
person’s movements for a month via a GPS monitoring device that 
police had attached to the driver’s vehicle without a warrant 
46 Id. at 352. 
47 Id. at 351. 
48 Id. at 352. 
49 Id. at 353. 
50 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
51 Id. at 360–61. 
52 Id. at 361. 
53 Id. 
54 Peter Winn, Katz and the Origins of the “Reasonable Expectation of 
Privacy” Test, 40 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1, 7 (2009). 
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violates the Fourth Amendment.55 In United States v. Jones, 
federal agents were investigating Mr. Jones for narcotics 
distribution and placed a GPS device under his Jeep without a 
warrant.56 For the next 28 days, agents used the device to track the 
Jeep and collected more than 2,000 pages of data.57 
Jones was convicted after the trial court found that his Fourth 
Amendment rights were not violated since there was no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in movements from one place to another.58 
On appeal, the Supreme Court found that a “reasonable person 
does not expect anyone to monitor and retain a record of every 
time he drives his car . . . rather, he expects his movements to 
remain ‘disconnected and anonymous.’”59 The Supreme Court’s 
opinion was not based on the Katz reasonable expectation of 
privacy test, but instead relied on the Olmstead analysis regarding 
common law trespass.60 
 
B.  Smith v. Maryland: Developing the Third-Party Doctrine 
 
The third-party doctrine further confuses a person’s privacy 
rights when electronic devices are involved. In Smith v. Maryland, 
the Supreme Court held that one who gives information to a third-
party does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy, and thus 
falls outside the purview of the Fourth Amendment.61 
In Smith, the defendant Smith was convicted of robbery after 
the police instructed the telephone company to monitor the phone 
numbers Smith dialed. 62 After the victim was robbed, she gave 
55 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012). 
56 Id. at 948. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 561 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (quoting 
United States v. Wylie, 569 F.2d 62, 6 (D.C. Cir. 1977)) (“[P]olice-citizen 
communications which take place under circumstances in which the citizen's 
‘freedom to walk away’ is not limited by anything other than his desire to 
cooperate do not amount to ‘seizures' of the person.”), cert. denied 131 S. Ct. 
671 (2010), aff’d, Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945. 
60 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 953. 
61 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979). 
62 Id. at 737. 
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police a description of the attacker and of an automobile parked 
near the scene.63 She also began receiving threatening phone calls 
from the same attacker.64 Eleven days later, a police officer spotted 
a man matching the description provided by the victim driving the 
same automobile.65 The police officer traced the license plate to 
Michael Smith.66 The next day the telephone company, at the 
request of the police department, installed a pen register at its main 
office to record the numbers dialed from Smith’s telephone.67 The 
police did not have a warrant before the company installed the pen 
register.68 The register revealed Smith had called the victim after 
the robbery, permitting police to obtain a warrant to search his 
home.69 Smith was arrested based on evidence gathered in his 
home and afterwards he was positively identified by the victim as 
her attacker.70 
During pre-trial motions, Smith sought to suppress all evidence 
derived from the pen register, claiming the pen register violated his 
Fourth Amendment right to privacy because the police failed to 
obtain a warrant.71 The trial court denied the motion and after 
Smith was convicted, he appealed.72 The court of appeals affirmed 
the conviction, holding that "there is no constitutionally protected 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers dialed into a 
telephone system and hence no search within the fourth 
amendment [sic] is implicated by the use of a pen register installed 
at the central offices of the telephone company.”73 Three judges 
dissented, one stating that individuals do have a legitimate 
expectation of privacy in the phone numbers they dial and 
concluding that the pen register was a search.74 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 737–38. 
73 Id. at 738 (quoting Smith v. State of Maryland, 283 Md. 156, 173 (1978)). 
74 Id. at 738. 
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The Supreme Court first quoted Katz v. United States in 
defining what constitutes a “search” under the Fourth 
Amendment.75 The Court noted the difference between Katz and 
the pen register used against Smith.76 In Katz the police used a 
device to listen to the content of the defendant’s conversation. 77 In 
Smith, the police only obtained a telephone number.78 The 
Supreme Court held that there is no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the numbers dialed from a phone because the user 
voluntarily dials the numbers and conveys the information to the 
telephone company.79 The justification for this holding was 
twofold. First, the Court doubted that “people in general entertain 
any actual expectation of privacy in the numbers they dial.”80 
Second, the Court wrote that even if Smith did have an expectation 
of privacy in the numbers he dialed, it was not one that society was 
willing to recognize as reasonable.81 This was based on the Court’s 
previous holdings that there is no legitimate expectation of privacy 
in information disclosed to a third party.82 
Three of the Justices dissented, believing that Smith had a right 
to privacy in the phone numbers he dialed, and that the pen register 
did constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment.83 Justice 
Thurgood Marshall wrote, “Privacy is not a discrete commodity, 
possessed absolutely or not at all. Those who disclose certain facts 
to a bank or phone company for a limited business purpose need 
not assume that this information will be released to other persons 
for other purposes.”84 There was no way for the Supreme Court to 
know its ruling would become the justification for the metadata 
75 Id. at 739–40. 
76 Id. at 740. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 745. 
80 Id. at 742. 
81 Id. at 743–44. 
82 Id. at 744 (citing United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442–444; Couch 
v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335–36; United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 
752 (plurality opinion); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966); Lopez 
v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963)). 
83 Smith, 442 U.S. at 746–52 (Stewart, Brennan, Marshall, JJ., dissenting). 
84 Id. at 740. 
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collection program. Yet the three dissenting Justices foreshadowed 
the exact issue that is currently the subject of public debate: 
whether society is ready to recognize a right to privacy in metadata 
collected under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act. 
 
II. ENACTMENT OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT 
 
Two pieces of legislation led to the metadata program under 
Section 215. The first is the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
of 1979, and the second is the USA PATRIOT Act, which has been 
amended several times since its inception in 2001.85 The last 
amendment expanded Section 215, which allowed the collection of 
metadata as revealed by the Snowden disclosures in 2013.86 
 
A.  The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978: Wiretapping 
and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
 
In order to implement the recommendations of the Church 
Committee Report, Congress enacted the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (“FISA”) of 1978.87 One of FISA’s goals was to 
reconcile the Church Committee’s concerns for protecting people 
against the abuse of power documented in the 1970’s with the 
preservation of the government’s ability to protect itself from 
foreign threat.88 Although Katz held that the Fourth Amendment 
prohibited the government from wiretapping without a warrant if 
the interception would produce evidence of criminal conduct, it 
remained unclear whether the same was true when the government 
investigated “activities of foreign power.”89 
FISA was designed to address these questions, and its creation 
involved strict rules and structured oversight by all three branches 
85 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), 50 U.S.C. § 1801 
et seq. (1978); USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, 107 Pub. L. No. 56, § 215, 115 
Stat. 272, 287–88 (2001) (codified in scattered titles of U.S.C.). 
86  USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, 120 
Stat. 196 § 106 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(A)). 
87 FISA § 1801. 
88 Id. at 64. 
89 United States v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Michigan, 407 U.S. 297, 308 (1972). 
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of government.90 FISA also created the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court (“FISC”) to provide judicial oversight of the 
government’s authority and to handle the classified information 
encompassed by foreign intelligence.91 Under the original FISA, 
any governmental agency seeking to use electronic surveillance for 
foreign intelligence purposes must obtain a warrant by showing 
probable cause that the target is an agent of a foreign power.92 
Between its enactment in 1978 and September 11, 2001, FISA only 
slightly widened its scope to include methods of investigation 
beyond electronic surveillance.93 
 
B.  September 11, 2001, and the USA PATRIOT Act 
 
The events that took place on September 11, 2001, caused the 
greatest number of casualties from a terrorist act on United States 
soil.94 In response to the 9/11 attacks, Former President George W. 
Bush declared a “war on terrorism.”95 On October 4, 2001, the 
Senate proposed legislation designed to enhance law 
enforcement’s ability to investigate potential and actual acts of 
terrorism.96 The Senate passed the bill with a vote of 96-to-1 after 
ten days.97 The House of Representatives proposed and approved 
its own version of an anti-terrorism bill the following day by a vote 
of 337 to 79.98 These measures led to the USA PATRIOT Act of 
2001, passed by Congress on October 25, 2001, and signed into 
law by President Bush the next day.99 The USA PATRIOT Act 
90 PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GROUP REPORT, supra note 9, at 65. 
91 Id. at 66. 
92 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–11. 
93 PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GROUP REPORT, supra note 9, at 68. 
94 Jennifer C. Evans, Hijacking Civil Liberties: The USA Patriot Act of 
2001, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 933, 959 (2002) [hereinafter Hijacking Civil 
Liberties]. 
95 George W. Bush, Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation 
(Sept. 11, 2001), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/ 
news/releases/2001/09/20010911-16.html. 
96 Evans, supra note 94, at 966. 
97 Id. at 966. 
98 Id. at 967. 
99 Id.  
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was designed to strengthen domestic security and broaden the 
powers of law enforcement agencies to identify and stop 
terrorism.100 Split into ten parts, Title II: Enhanced Surveillance 
Procedures authorizes metadata collection under Section 215.101 
 
C.   The Metadata Collection Program is Created under  
Section 215 in Two FISC Orders  
 
When FISA was originally enacted in 1978, the government 
did not have authority to compel documents.102 Congress amended 
FISA in 1998 after the Oklahoma bombings to allow FISC to 
compel a narrow set of documents.103 The USA PATRIOT Act 
significantly expanded FISC’s authority to compel documents, but 
was narrowed in the USA PATRIOT Act Improvement and 
Reauthorization Act of 2005.104 As codified, Section 215 
authorizes FISC to issue an order for the “production of any 
tangible things (including books, records, papers, documents, and 
other items) for an investigation to obtain foreign intelligence 
information not concerning a United States person or to protect 
against international terrorism.”105 Through two FISC orders, 
however, the systematic metadata collection program was created. 
First, FISC authorized mass collection of metadata in the “Primary 
Order.”106 Second, Verizon was ordered to submit metadata to 
FISC and the NSA on an ongoing basis through the “Secondary 
Order.”107 
 
100 Id. at 965. 
101 USA PATRIOT ACT OF 2001, 107 PUB. L. NO. 56, § 215, 115 STAT. 272, 
287–88 (2001) (CODIFIED IN SCATTERED TITLES OF U.S.C.). 
102 PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GROUP REPORT, supra note 9, at 80. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 81; USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 
2005, 120 Stat. 196 § 106 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(A)). 
105 USA PATRIOT ACT § 215. 
106 Primary Order, supra note 4. 
107 In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of 
Tangible Things From Verizon Bus. Network Servs., Inc. ex. rel. MCI Commc'n 
Servs. Inc. d/b/a Verizon Bus. Servs., No. BR 13–80, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
147002, (FISA Ct. Apr. 25, 2013) [hereinafter Secondary Order]. 
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1. The Primary Order to Collect Metadata 
 
The NSA, under Section 215, issued a Primary Order in 2006 
that set out the framework and requirements for the mass collection 
of metadata.108 The Primary Order required a high-ranking NSA 
official to determine if there is a reasonable articulable suspicion 
that the number being queried is associated with an international 
terrorist organization.109 Currently, there are 22 designated agents 
who can authorize a query.110 These agents may access the 
information without approval from a FISC court order.111 The 
Government must seek authorization for Section 215 periodically 
from FISC, which it does typically every 90 days.112 
Since 2006, different FISC judges have authorized the use of 
Section 215 35 times.113 However, during the authorization 
process, FISC found on one occasion that the Government failed to 
comply with the minimization procedures.114 In January 2009, the 
government reported that it used an “alert list” to search metadata 
that was not approved under the requisite reasonable articulable 
suspicion standard.115 The FISC judge concluded that the 
government engaged in systematic noncompliance and ordered the 
NSA to seek FISC approval before conducting any inquiry for a 
probationary six-month period.116 
Once an agent authorizes a query of a suspect, the agent enters 
the phone number with which the suspect is associated.117 The 
phone number is the original identifier and is called a “seed.”118 
108 Id. at 3–4. 
109 Id. at 5–7. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 9. 
112 Id. 
113 In Re Production of Tangible Things from [Undisclosed Service 
Provider], Docket Number BR 08–13 (Mar. 2, 2009) (authorizing Section 215 
35 times from 2006 through October 2013). 
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
116 Id.; Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 18 (stating the probationary 
period lasted only six months). 
117 Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 16. 
118 Id. 
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When a seed is queried, it is referred to as a “hop.”119 When the 
phone number is initially queried during the first hop, the NSA 
captures all metadata directly associated with that seed.120 The 
NSA can then make a second hop, in which the NSA captures all 
metadata associated with each number identified from the first 
hop.121 The NSA had authorization, until February 5, 2014, to 
make one additional hop, for a total of three hops.122 Once the 
NSA has collected metadata from the three hops, it can conduct an 
unlimited number of searches with the breadth of data collected 
without oversight from FISC and without making additional 
reasonable articulable suspicion determinations.123 
 
2. The Secondary Order Directing Verizon to Submit Metadata 
 
The Secondary Order directed Verizon to provide to the NSA 
all metadata “on an ongoing daily basis.”124 It directed Verizon to 
produce “all call detail records” or “telephony metadata” created 
both between the United States and abroad, and “wholly within the 
United States, including local telephone calls.”125 The metadata 
included session-identifying information, trunk identifier, 
telephone calling card numbers, and call durations.126 The last part 
of the order prohibited Verizon from disclosing any information 
given to the NSA or FBI.127 Because of the gag order, Verizon and 
other phone companies could not discuss or reveal that their 
customers’ metadata was being systematically transmitted to the 
NSA until the Snowden disclosures leaked the information.128 
 
119 ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 734 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 2013). 
120 Id. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
123 Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 17. 
124 Secondary Order, supra note 107. 
125 Id. at 3. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. at 2–3. 
128 Id. 
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III. CURRENT CHALLENGES TO THE METADATA COLLECTION 
PROGRAM AUTHORIZED BY SECTION 215 OF THE  
USA PATRIOT ACT 
 
Since Snowden revealed classified documents uncovering the 
metadata collection program, there have been several challenges 
regarding the constitutionality of Section 215. First, two U.S. 
District Courts have issued conflicting holdings regarding Section 
215.129 Second, the Presidential Review Group’s massive review 
on the USA PATRIOT Act found Section 215 to be 
unconstitutional.130 Third, none of President Obama’s proposed 
changes to Section 215 have been passed into law.131 Fourth, 
Congress proposed several pieces of legislation reforming Section 
215 that are currently sitting in House Committees.132 
 
A.  Klayman v. Obama: Section 215 is  
Likely to be Unconstitutional 
 
In Klayman v. Obama, the court found the NSA program 
“almost certainly” violates the Fourth Amendment.133 The court 
distinguished the current NSA program from the pen register in 
Smith, claiming an “Orwellian” intelligence gathering system 
between telecommunication companies and the Government.134 
The court in Klayman found that the problem with this system is 
that people have entirely different relationships with phones today 
129 ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 757; Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. 
Supp. 2d 1, 43. 
130 PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GROUP REPORT, supra note 9. 
131 The White House, FACT SHEET: The Administration’s Proposal for 
Ending the Section 215 Bulk Telephony Metadata Program, THE WHITE HOUSE 
(Mar. 27, 2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/03/27/fact-
sheet-administration-s-proposal-ending-section-215-bulk-telephony-m 
[hereinafter Obama’s Proposal for Ending Section 215]. 
132 LIBERT-E Act, H.R. 2399, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013); USA 
FREEDOM Act, H.R. 3361, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013); Telephone Metadata 
Reform Act, H.R. 3875, 113th Cong. (2nd Sess. 2014). 
133 Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 32 (“I believe that bulk telephony metadata 
collection and analysis almost certainly does violate a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.”). 
134 Id. at 33; see supra note 5 (defining “Orwellian”). 
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than they did when the third-party doctrine was created in Smith.135 
Call records, which then would have given the police only 
scattered information about one’s life, now “reveal an entire 
mosaic—a vibrant and constantly updating picture of the person’s 
life.”136 The court further reasoned that modern society is better 
prepared and more willing to accept a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in a phone’s metadata, making the metadata program 
unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.137 
 
B.  ACLU v. Clapper: Section 215 is Constitutional under the 
Third-Party Doctrine 
 
In ACLU v. Clapper, the ACLU and other non-profit 
organizations filed a lawsuit less than a week after the disclosure 
of the Secondary Order.138 The NSA collected metadata of the 
ACLU, a Verizon customer, as required by the Secondary 
Order.139 The ACLU’s phone records could be used to identify 
confidential clients such as journalists, legislators, and members of 
the public.140 This, they argued, violated their First and Fourth 
Amendment rights.141 
The court followed a strict reading of Smith.142 It held that, 
because Verizon users—ACLU included—voluntarily transmitted 
numbers they dialed, there was no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in those numbers.143 The court stated that the sheer volume 
of information the NSA can collect and store does not make it a 
Fourth Amendment violation.144 Ultimately, the court dismissed 
the case for lack of standing. 145 The ACLU filed an appeal on 
135 Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 36. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. 
138 ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 735 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
139 Id. at 735. 
140 Id.  
141 Id.  
142 Id. at 751–52. 
143 Id. at 752. 
144 Id.  
145 Id. at 754. 
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March 6, 2014.146 The Government’s reply brief was filed on April 
10, 2014.147 The ACLU filed an additional reply brief on April 24, 
2014, and the case is pending hearing as of the writing of this 
Article.148 
 
C.  The President’s Review Group Report Recommends 
Terminating Metadata Collection due to  
Privacy Concerns 
 
In response to the general concerns of the American public 
after the Snowden disclosures, President Obama created the 
Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies 
(“President’s Review Group”).149 The President’s Review Group 
published a document (“The Report”) consisting of 46 policy 
recommendations to the President that cover a variety of NSA 
programs, including Section 215 of The USA PATRIOT Act.150 
The recommendations consider both the public’s civil liberties and 
the necessity of homeland security.151 With respect to Section 215, 
The Report recommends the NSA end bulk storage of metadata.152 
It suggests a third-party hold the data instead.153 The President’s 
Review Group cites privacy concerns, similar to those discussed in 
this Article, as its justification for terminating the metadata 
program as currently administered by the NSA.154 
146 Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants, ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724 
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 2013) (No. 14-42), https://www.aclu.org/ 
sites/default/files/assets/corrected_brief_of_plaintiffs-appellants_-_final_ 
stamped_03_07_2014.pdf. 
147 Brief for Defendants-Appellees, ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724 
(S.D.N.Y. Dec 27, 2013) (No. 14-42), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/ 
files/assets/2014-04-10_clapper_govt-opposition-brief.pdf. 
148 Reply Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants, ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 
724 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 2013) (No. 14-42) https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/ 
files/assets/aclu_v._clapper_ca2_reply_brief_final_stamped.pdf. 
149 PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GROUP REPORT, supra note 9. 
150 Id. 
151 Id. at 1. 
152 Id. at 17. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. at 86–88 (citing In Re Production of Tangible Things from 
Undisclosed Service Provider, Docket Number BR: 08-13 (Mar. 2, 2009)). 
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D.  President Obama’s Proposed Changes and Pending 
Congressional Legislation 
 
In a speech regarding the NSA’s programs, President Obama 
told the American people that the metadata collection program 
would continue, although not as broadly.155 However, through a 
Presidential Directive, President Obama eliminated the third 
hop.156 Further, President Obama instructed the Attorney General 
to develop a new method to match the capabilities of Section 215 
without the NSA actually holding the metadata.157 
While several bills have been proposed to reform Section 215 
in the House of Representatives, the USA FREEDOM Act has the 
most support with 142 co-sponsors.158 The USA FREEDOM Act 
was introduced in the House of Representatives on October 29, 
2013.159 USA FREEDOM stands for “Uniting and Strengthening 
America by Fulfilling Rights and Ending Eavesdropping, Dragnet-
collection, and Online Monitoring” Act.160 This Act would amend 
the PATRIOT Act similarly to the LIBERT-E Act.161 Both bills 
propose the FBI must include a statement of facts indicating that 
there are “reasonable grounds to believe that the tangible things 
sought are relevant and material to an authorized investigation” in 
order to request metadata records from a phone provider.162 
On January 9, 2014, this bill was also referred to the 
subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and 
155 President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Review of 
Signals Intelligence (Jan. 17, 2014) (transcript available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/17/remarks-president-
review-signals-intelligence) [hereinafter President Obama’s Remarks]. 
156 Id. 
157 Obama’s Proposal for Ending Section 215, supra note 131. 
158 USA FREEDOM Act, H.R. 3361, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013); 
Congress, Summary: H.R. 3361 – USA FREEDOM Act, CONGRESS.GOV (Oct. 
29, 2013), http://beta.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/3361; see also 
LIBERT-E Act, H.R. 2399, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013); Telephone Metadata 
Reform Act, H.R. 3875, 113th Cong. (2nd Sess. 2014). 
159 Summary: H.R. 3361 – USA FREEDOM Act, supra note 158. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. at § 101(a)(1)(B). 
162 Id. 
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Investigations.163 On May 22, 2014, this bill passed the House of 
Representatives as amended.164 
 
IV. THE STANDARD TO SEARCH METADATA SHOULD BE  
RAISED TO A PROBABLE CAUSE STANDARD  
BECAUSE OF VAST PRIVACY CONCERNS 
 
Benjamin Franklin once said, “Those who would give up 
essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary safety, deserve 
neither Liberty nor Safety.”165 However, in the modern world, 
government surveillance of people at home and abroad is 
necessary to protect against threats that Mr. Franklin could never 
have imagined.166 When does the government cross the line 
between safety and liberty? The Snowden leaks startled many 
Americans because of the seeming impossibility that a democratic 
state could become a surveillance state.167 Civil liberties groups 
have called for the elimination of metadata collection—citing 
egregious civil rights violations—by bringing lawsuits against the 
NSA and President Obama.168 
163 Id. 
164 Summary: H.R. 3361 – USA FREEDOM Act, supra note 158. 
165 Benjamin Franklin, Pennsylvania Assembly: Reply to the Governor, 
Nov. 11, 1755, NATIONAL ARCHIVE FOUNDERS ONLINE, 
http://franklinpapers.org/franklin/framedVolumes.jsp?vol=6&page=238a (last 
visited July 31, 2014). 
166 In re FBI, No. 13-109, 2013 WL 5307991, at *30–31 (FISA Ct. Aug. 29, 
2013) (stating that “telephony metadata” includes comprehensive 
communications routing information, such as including originating and 
terminating telephone number, International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) 
number, International Mobile station Equipment Identity (IMEI) number, trunk 
identifier, telephone calling card numbers, and time and duration of call). 
167 See supra note 5 (defining “Orwellian”). 
168 E.g., ACLU, Time to Rein in the Surveillance State, ACLU.ORG, 
https://www.aclu.org/time-rein-surveillance-state-0 (last visited Apr. 25, 2014) 
(“The ACLU has been at the forefront of the struggle to rein in the surveillance 
superstructure, which strikes at the core of our rights to privacy, free speech, and 
association.”); Electronic Frontier Foundation, NSA Spying on Americans, 
EFF.ORG, https://www.eff.org/nsa-spying (“EFF has been at the forefront of the 
effort to stop [surveillance of communications] and bring government 
surveillance programs back within the law and the Constitution.”) (last visited 
Apr. 25, 2014). 
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Following public backlash regarding metadata collection, all 
three branches of the Government are taking action. After 
President Obama spoke to the American people specifically about 
Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act,169 he issued a Presidential 
Policy Directive reigning in aspects of the metadata collection 
program. Additionally, there are roughly 30 different legislative 
bills before Congress altering the metadata collection program.170 
Two circuit courts have ruled on the opposite sides of the 
constitutionality of Section 215.171 Political activist Larry Klayman 
appealed his case, Klayman v. Obama, directly to the Supreme 
Court on February 3, 2014, citing its “imperative public 
importance.”172 However, the Supreme Court denied his petition, 
leaving the constitutionality of Section 215 unresolved.173 While 
the exact fate of the metadata collection program remains 
unknown, the Government’s proposed actions merely provide a 
façade of change. 
President Obama’s Policy Directive and Congress’ attempt at 
legislation with the USA FREEDOM Act are both superficial 
attempts at rectifying privacy concerns because the Government 
does not concede to the necessity of a warrant to search metadata, 
as required for searches under the Fourth Amendment. Instead, the 
current reasonable articulable suspicion standard is kept intact in 
the proposed legislation from both the House of Representatives 
and President Obama.174 The Government, through FISC court 
documents, continually relies on the third-party doctrine in 
169 President Obama’s Remarks, supra note 155. 
170 David Kravets, Supreme Court passes on NSA bulk phone surveillance 
case, ARS TECHNICA (Apr. 7, 2014, 6:46 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/2014/04/supreme-court-passes-on-nsa-bulk-phone-surveillance-case/. 
171 Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 43 (D.D.C. 2013); ACLU v. 
Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 757 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
172 134 S. Ct. 1795 (Apr. 7, 2014). 
173 Id. 
174 H.R. 3361 – USA FREEDOM Act, supra note 158; President Obama’s 
Remarks, supra note 155; Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-28, Signals 
Intelligence Activities, THE WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 17, 2014), 
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/17/presidential-policy-directive-
signals-intelligence-activities. 
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denying a reasonable expectation of privacy in metadata.175 
However, the third-party doctrine fails to take into account the vast 
privacy concerns associated with modern technology. 
Because so much information about a person’s private life can 
be gleaned from the collection of metadata, the Government should 
be required to obtain a warrant before searching metadata. As 
required by the Fourth Amendment, the standard for a warrant is 
probable cause.176 Thus, the NSA should be required to make a 
probable cause determination to perform a “hop” on an American 
citizen’s metadata. This requirement will protect citizens’ privacy 
rights regardless of whether the NSA or the phone companies hold 
the metadata. 
 
A.  The Reasonable Articulable Suspicion Standard should be 
Updated because It Fails to Take Into Account the  
Reasonable Expectation of Privacy that should be  
Associated with Metadata 
 
Although The President’s Review Group found Section 215 to 
be unconstitutional, the metadata program may be a useful tool in 
the fight against terrorism, as President Obama has argued.177 For 
this reason, instead of suggesting an end to the metadata program, 
the standard for searching metadata during a hop should be 
changed to require a higher burden of proof showing that the seed 
being queried is associated with terrorist activity. When FISA was 
originally enacted, the Government had to show probable cause to 
believe the target of the electronic surveillance was an agent of a 
foreign power.178 This required FISC to obtain a warrant from a 
neutral and detached magistrate before accessing sensitive data.179 
However, in the wake of 9/11, the threshold was lowered to 
require only “specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe 
175 See, e.g., In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the 
Production of Tangible Things from [Redacted], No. BR 13-109, 2013 WL 
5741573 at *2–6 (Foreign Intel. Surv. Ct. Aug. 29, 2013). 
176 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
177 President Obama’s Remarks, supra note 155.  
178 50 U.S.C. § 1805. 
179 President’s Review Group Report, supra note 9, at 88–89. 
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that the person to whom the records pertain is a foreign power or 
an agent of a foreign power.”180 This standard was too open-ended 
and Congress again changed the standard required to search 
metadata under Section 215 to “a statement of facts showing that 
there are reasonable grounds to believe that the tangible objects 
sought are relevant.”181 The standards used in both thresholds (the 
lowered one of 2001, and the slightly higher one of 2005) rely on 
the out-of-date third-party doctrine and privacy justifications. 
Additionally, the Report points out the ease with which the 
NSA has abused the metadata program.182 It cited that “[a]lmost 90 
percent of the numbers on the alert list did not meet the 
‘reasonable, articulable suspicion’ standard.”183 The NSA should 
be required to obtain a warrant from FISC before performing any 
queries because metadata reveals detailed information about a 
person. 
 
1. Metadata Reveals Highly Personal and Sensitive Information 
Subject to Fourth Amendment Protection 
 
Since the Snowden revelations, those in charge of intelligence 
have downplayed the significance of metadata.184 President Obama 
assured the American people the content of calls was not being 
collected.185 The Chairwoman of the Senate’s Committee on 
Intelligence, Dianne Feinstein, remarked that “this is just 
180 See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, 
Pub. L. 107-56, § 215, 115 Stat. 272, 287 (2001) (codified as amended at 50 
U.S.C. § 1861(a)(1)). 
181 USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, 120 
Stat. 196 § 106 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(A)).  
182 President’s Review Group Report, supra note 9, at 105. 
183 Id. 
184 See, e.g., Transcript: Diane Feinstein, Saxby Chambliss, Explain, 
Defend NSA Phone Records Program, WASH. POST (Jun. 6, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2013/06/06/transcript-
dianne-feinstein-saxby-chambliss-explain-defend-nsa-phone-records-program 
[hereinafter Senator Feinstein’s Remarks]; President Obama’s Remarks, supra 
note 155.  
185 President Obama’s Remarks, supra note 155.  
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metadata.”186 Although voice content can be hard to process and 
difficult to collect on a mass scale, metadata is perfectly suited to 
computer analysis.187 Metadata can show the context of a person’s 
life and give an intimate look into one’s interests, values, and 
societal roles.188 Metadata can also be a rich source for obtaining 
sensitive information about one’s identity, location, and social 
network.189 When cross-checked against easily accessed public 
records, metadata can reveal a person’s name, address, credit 
history, and more.190 Although the metadata collection program 
offers powerful tools in the fight against terrorism, it severely 
implicates personal expectations of privacy.191 
In an Amici Curiae Brief written in support of a reversal of 
ACLU v. Clapper by the Electronic Frontier Foundation, a small 
but compelling example is given demonstrating the sensitivities 
associated with the collection of metadata. If a single telephone 
call to a bookie is made, it suggests that a person likely made a 
bet.192 But an analysis of metadata over time could reveal that the 
same person has a gambling problem.193 While aggregating 
metadata is troubling for an individual, it is even more troubling 
when connections are made between individuals and larger social 
trends.194 Analysis of metadata over time can “map the 
associations of individuals, revealing friendships, business 
186 Senator Feinstein’s Remarks, supra note 184. 
187 Brian Lam, Phew, NSA Is Just Collecting Metadata. (You Should Still 
Worry), WIRED.COM (June 19, 2013), http://www.wired.com/2013/06/phew-it-
was-just-metadata-not-think-again/. 
188 Id. 
189 David Gray & Danielle Citron, The Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98 
MINN. L. REV. 62, 64 (2013). 
190 Dan Roberts & Spencer Ackerman, Anger Swells After NSA Phone 
Records Court Order Revelations, THE GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/obama-administration-nsa-
verizon-records. 
191 Grey, supra note 189, at 67. 
192 Brief for ACLU, et al. as Amici Curiae Brief of Experts in Computer 
and Data Science in Support of Appellants and Reversal, ACLU v. Clapper, 959 
F. Supp. 2d 724 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 14-42) [hereinafter ACLU Amici Curiae 
Brief]. 
193 Id. at 11–12. 
194 Id. at 12. 
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relationships, and social and political connections.”195 While this 
language focuses on the individual, collecting and searching 
metadata affects the lives of millions of Americans. 
Each time the NSA performs a hop, the number of people 
Section 215 affects expands exponentially. For example, Person X 
is a suspect, and he made 100 phone calls. The NSA would have 
access to all 100 of those phone numbers Person X was in contact 
with. The NSA then has authorization to make a second hop; that 
is, to take the 100 phone numbers associated with Person X and 
look at the metadata associated with each of those numbers.196 
Further, if the 100 people Person X contacted each also contacted 
100 people, the pool of metadata would now include 10,000 total 
phone numbers (100 people times 100 phone numbers). 
A third hop would take the 10,000 phone numbers that were 
pooled during the second hop, and look at every number that was 
contacted. If each of those 10,000 people called 100 people, the 
metadata pool would now consist of 100 phone numbers (first hop) 
times 100 phone numbers (second hop) times 100 phone numbers 
(third hop), totaling a pool of one million phone numbers to query. 
Until President Obama’s speech on January 17, 2014, the NSA had 
authorization to make the third hop.197 FISC formally approved 
removing the third hop on February 5, 2014, stating its deletion 
adequately balances privacy and national security interests set forth 
in President Obama’s Presidential Policy Directive.198 
To illustrate this point with real people, an online blog, 
Webpolicy.org, performed a short-term study to learn if sensitive 
and personal inferences could be drawn from metadata.199 
195 Id. 
196 Id. 
197 Id.; President Obama’s Remarks, supra note 155 (“Effective 
immediately, we will only pursue phone calls that are two steps removed from a 
number associated with a terrorist organization instead of the current three.”). 
198 In re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order 
Requiring the Production of Tangible Things, No. BR 14-01 (FISA Ct. Feb. 5, 
2014); Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-28, supra note 174. 
199 Jonathan Mayer & Patrick Mutchler, MetaPhone: The Sensitivity of 
Telephone Metadata, WEBPOLICY.ORG (Mar. 12, 2014), http://webpolicy.org/ 
2014/03/12/metaphone-the-sensitivity-of-telephone-metadata/ (last visited Apr. 
28, 2014). 
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Beginning in November 2013, WebPolicy.org had participants 
install the “MetaPhone” application on their Android phones.200 
MetaPhone runs in the background of the user’s device and 
submits device logs and social media information for analysis.201 
While this study is on a relatively small scale (546 participants), 
WebPolicy.org found that “phone metadata is unambiguously 
sensitive, even in a small population and over a short time 
window.”202 In total, the 546 participants contacted 33,688 unique 
phone numbers.203 18 percent of those numbers were identifiable 
by matching phone numbers against public records, such as Yelp 
and Google Places directories.204 Participants had contacted 
Alcoholics Anonymous, labor unions, divorce lawyers, strip clubs, 
and sexually transmitted disease clinics.205 
Additionally, the study indicated a pattern of calls that revealed 
more sensitive information than individual call records.206 For 
example, a participant made phone calls to local neurology groups, 
a specialty pharmacy, a rare condition management service, and a 
hotline for a drug used solely to treat multiple sclerosis.207 An 
inference can be made, based on this participant’s metadata alone, 
that this participant has a serious medical condition. 
WebPolicy.org was able to corroborate this participant’s medical 
condition proving that metadata does reveal personal and sensitive 
content.208 Another participant had a long telephone call with her 
sister, then two days later placed a series of calls to Planned 
Parenthood.209 She placed another series of calls two weeks later, 
and a final call a month after.210 As this study shows, the NSA can 
gather and use power data with the tools it currently has at its 
disposal.  
200 Id. 
201 Id. 
202 Id. 
203 Id. 
204 Id. 
205 Id. 
206 Id. 
207 Id. 
208 Id. 
209 Id. 
210 Id. 
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To collect and search a person’s metadata, the government 
should have to show probable cause that the person whose records 
are being searched is associated with international terrorism or 
clandestine intelligence activities.211 Gathering the metadata on 
Person X and everyone whom each of those 100 people contacted 
is an egregious violation of privacy. Because of the privacy 
implications and the breadth of information that can be quickly 
amassed, the NSA should not be allowed to collect metadata 
without individualized suspicion that Person X is associated with 
terrorism. 
 
2. The Third-Party Doctrine should be Updated in Light of 
Modern Technology 
 
The third-party doctrine should be updated to reflect the 
modern relationship between a person and his cell phone. In 
United States v. Jones, Justice Sotomayor foreshadowed concerns 
over gathering information through surveillance, noting it could 
lead to “a too permeating police surveillance.”212 She suggested 
that it might be “necessary to reconsider the premise that an 
individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information 
voluntarily disclosed to third parties.”213 Much like Justice 
Brandeis’ dissent in Olmstead v. United States, Justice 
Sotomayor’s concurrence is at the forefront of the privacy 
argument in the new age.214 
The third-party doctrine, as established in Smith v. Maryland, 
states that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
information voluntarily handed over to a third-party.215 FISC relies 
211 50 U.S.C. § 1861(a)(1) (using the same language as the statute that the 
“tangible things sought are relevant . . . against international terrorism or 
clandestine intelligence activities”). 
212 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayer, J., 
concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
213 Id. at 957. 
214 ACLU Amici Curiae Brief, supra note 192, at 11 (using Justice 
Sotomayor’s concurrence to make the argument that aggregated metadata 
generated a comprehensive record of people’s habits). 
215 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745 (holding there is no reasonable 
expectation of privacy when a person voluntarily gives their number to a third 
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on the holding in Smith to defend the production of metadata by 
telephone service providers to the NSA.216 A person who gets a 
cell phone voluntarily discloses metadata to his or her cell carrier, 
a third-party, and his or her expectation of privacy is defeated. 
However, the facts of Smith are vastly different from what the 
NSA is doing under Section 215.217 Today’s circumstances have 
become so unlike those of the 1970s that the precedent set in Smith 
becomes completely frustrated. These circumstances include the 
Government’s surveillance capabilities, the modern day 
relationship users have with their cell phones, and the relationship 
between the phone companies and the NSA.218 
In Klayman, the Court found four main reasons that the third-
party doctrine cannot justify the modern surveillance program 
under Section 215.219 First, the pen register installed on Smith’s 
phone was to last a mere 13 days, and it collected data regarding 
that case only.220 Thus the information collected was short-term 
and highly limited.221 In contrast, the information that the NSA 
collects is vast and on-going over the course of half a decade.222 
Second, in Smith, the police requested the phone company install 
the pen register on its own equipment to record the numbers 
dialed.223 Under the current Secondary Order, telephone 
companies are required to provide the NSA records “on a daily 
basis.”224 The Government forces the third-parties (the telephone 
companies) to “create a formalized policy under which the service 
provider collects information for law enforcement purposes,” 
party). 
216 In re FBI, No. 13-109, 2013 WL 5307991, at *9 (FISA Ct. Aug. 29, 
2013). 
217 See Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 32. 
218 Id. 
219 Id. at 32–34. 
220 Id. 
221 Id. 
222 Id. (noting the metadata program could last indefinitely so long as the 
war on terror persists, which could be forever versus the collection of 
information in Smith was specifically to convict Smith of one crime, to be used 
in one trial, and then discarded). 
223 Id. at 17. 
224 Id. at 19 (emphases added) (quoting Secondary Order, supra note 107) 
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circumventing the Fourth Amendment.225 
Third, the Smith Court in the 1970s could not have conceived 
of the collection of metadata on such an expansive scale.226 
Finally, the scale on which people use their phones is inherently 
different than it was in the 1970s.227 Not only is there a significant 
increase in phone usage (71,958,000 homes with phones in 1979 
versus 326,475,248 mobile subscribers in 2012),228 but the 
relationship between phone and user is also more personal than 
ever before.229 Because of modern and intimate use of phones, 
information that is gleaned from metadata has changed not only in 
quantity but also in quality.230 
Creating a trail of metadata is an unavoidable byproduct of 
modern life and metadata should not be considered in a vacuum.231 
The ACLU Amici Curiae Brief argued that metadata is generated 
through the “innumerable and near-continuous digital transactions 
and interactions” presented by modern life.232 Financial 
transactions, medical records, travel records, communications, 
legal proceedings, biological information, education, health care, 
and entertainment are personal “digital tracks” every person leaves 
by simply participating in modern life.233 Acts such as applying for 
a loan, renting a DVD, sending or receiving a package, files, or 
receiving medications through the mail generate metadata.234 It 
would be practically impossible for an individual to avoid creating 
metadata in today’s world.235 A person can no longer assume the 
risk that their information may be handed over to a third-party 
because this transaction has now become a daily, if not hourly, 
occurrence. 
Information that was once scattered now reveals a mosaic of a 
225 Id. at 19. 
226 Id. 
227 See id. at 20–21. 
228 Id. at 20. 
229 See id. at 20–21. 
230 Id. 
231 ACLU Amici Curiae Brief, supra note 192, at 15. 
232 Id. at 16. 
233 Id. 
234 Id. at 16–17. 
235 Id. at 18. 
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person’s life.236 The modern changes in technology render the 
third-party doctrine outdated and in need of a new jurisprudence 
that considers an updated look at the expectation of privacy in 
metadata information. 
 
B.  The Actions Proposed by the Government are Ineffective 
because They Maintain the Lower “Reasonable and 
Articulable Suspicion” Standard 
 
The Government’s proposed legislation is ineffective because 
it fails to raise the needed threshold to probable cause and 
continues to diminish citizens’ privacy concerns. Representative 
James Sensenbrenner, Jr., the original author of the USA 
PATRIOT ACT and lead author on the proposed USA FREEDOM 
Act, acknowledged that “the NSA was doing some things that were 
far beyond what the intent of the law should have been . . . .”237 He 
criticized Senator Feinstein’s proposed legislation, specifically 
noting that her bill “is a joke” and her view is essentially that “if 
you like your NSA, you can keep it.”238 What Congress and the 
President fail to mention, however, is that the problem lies not only 
with mass collection of metadata, but also in the way the 
Government is able to access and search the metadata. This 
troubling standard remains unchanged and leaves the door open to 
a multitude of privacy violations. 
President Obama’s Policy Directive is superficial because it 
fails to provide any substantial changes that protect privacy rights. 
In President Obama’s speech to the American people, he proudly 
claimed to end Section 215 metadata collection “as it currently 
exists.”239 However, bulk collection is not the biggest problem. 
The problem is not where the metadata is being stored, but how the 
236 Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 36 (referencing the mosaic 
theory from Maynard, 615 F.3d at 562–63). 
237 Brendan Sasso & Bob Cusack, Patriot Act author: Feinstein’s bill ‘a 
joke’, THE HILL (Dec. 10, 2013, 6:00 AM), 
http://thehill.com/homenews/house/192561-feinsteins-nsa-bill-is-a-joke-says-
rep-james-sensenbrenner. 
238 Id. 
239 President Obama’s Remarks, supra note 155. 
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metadata is accessed. 
First, President Obama limited the NSA to searching metadata 
within only two hops of the selection term being used instead of 
three.240 Second, the metadata would no longer be collected in bulk 
by the NSA but would remain with the phone companies.241 Third, 
the NSA would obtain the records pursuant to individual orders 
from FISC.242 Although these recommendations appear to solve 
the problem of “dragnet surveillance,” they fail to provide any real 
safety from abuse by the NSA.243 
The problem with President Obama’s Presidential Policy 
Directive is that it is not binding.244 Presidential Directives can be 
amended or withdrawn at any time by the current President.245 
Even if Americans trust President Obama to follow through on the 
policy directives he proposed, the president in 2016 could reverse 
those changes with the swipe of a pen.246 Unless codified in a 
statute by Congress, any future president, at any time and for any 
reason, could re-instate the third hop and bring metadata collection 
back under the purview of the NSA. 
Additionally, none of the bills Congress has offered produce 
any substantial change to Section 215. None of the thirty-plus bills 
mention raising the standard from reasonable, articulable suspicion 
to probable cause. Most of the bills proposed, including the 
flagship USA FREEDOM Act, herald an ending to bulk metadata 
collection.247 However, the USA FREEDOM Act barely amends 
240 Obama’s Proposal for Ending Section 215, supra note 131. 
241 Id. 
242 Id. 
243 Electronic Frontier Foundation, NSA Spying on Americans, EFF.ORG, 
https://www.eff.org/nsa-spying (last visited Apr. 14, 2014) (“The US 
government, with assistance from major telecommunications carriers including 
AT&T, has engaged in a massive illegal dragnet surveillance of domestic 
communications and communications records of millions of ordinary Americans 
since at least 2001.”). 
244 Todd F. Gaziano, The Use and Abuse of Executive Orders and Other 
Presidential Directives, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION (Feb. 21, 2001), 
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2001/02/the-use-and-abuse-of-
executive-orders-and-other-presidential-directives. 
245 Id. 
246 Id. 
247 Summary: H.R. 3361 – USA FREEDOM Act, supra note 158. 
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the current standard. Current law requires the government to 
submit a statement of facts showing reasonable grounds to believe 
that the tangible things or records sought are relevant to an 
authorized investigation.248  
Yet Section 101 of the USA FREEDOM Act would require the 
Government to show that the tangible things sought are relevant 
and material to an authorized investigation and that they pertain to 
(a) a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power, (b) the 
activities of a suspected agent of a foreign power who is the 
subject of such an authorized investigation, or (c) an individual in 
contact with, or known to, a suspected agent of a foreign power 
who is the subject of such authorized investigation.249 This 
proposed change only narrows what can be considered an 
“authorized investigation.” The NSA would still be able to collect 
and search metadata based on the lowered standard of reasonable 
and articulable suspicion. 
Unless the standard necessary to collect and search metadata is 
raised to probable cause and requires the NSA to obtain a search 
warrant from a neutral and detached magistrate, the same concerns 
that are currently present could be reinstated even if the proposed 
actions are implemented. FISC could reinstate dragnet bulk 
metadata collection under the NSA’s direction. FISC previously 
concluded in 2009 that for two-and-a-half years the NSA had 
“frequently and systematically violated” the minimization 
procedures put in place to prevent abuse.250 FISC Judge Walton 
also found additional noncompliance issues involving trained 
analysts querying the metadata without being aware that they were 
doing so.251 The FBI could once again issue National Security 
Letters forcing Verizon and other telecommunication companies to 
comply with ongoing metadata disclosure. Verizon would have no 
way to disclose such an order to the public because every National 
Security Letter contains a gag order forbidding the receiver from 
248 USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, 120 
Stat. 196 § 106 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(A)). 
249 Summary: H.R. 3361 – USA FREEDOM Act, supra note 158. 
250 President’s Review Group Report, supra note 9, at 105. 
251 Id. at 106. 
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revealing the Letter’s existence.252 The actions the Government, 
including President Obama and Congress, are proposing are simply 
not enough to protect American citizens’ privacy rights. 
It is unlikely that searching metadata in the fight against 
terrorism will ever cease.253 By requiring the standard to be raised 
to probable cause instead of reasonable and articulable suspicion, 
Americans will know their privacy is protected under the Fourth 
Amendment no matter what agency or company is holding their 
metadata. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The metadata information the Government is able to collect, 
store, and search on a massive scale makes Section 215 a violation 
of the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment is clear: to 
search a constitutionally protected area, one must have probable 
cause and obtain a warrant from a detached and neutral judge.254 
That is not being done under the metadata program.255 Although 
the Government has proposed legislation to modify parts of 
Section 215, it has failed to change the standard under which the 
NSA can search metadata. Because enormous amounts of 
information can be gleaned from metadata revealing the intimacies 
of a person’s life, it is time to recognize a right to privacy in 
metadata. By giving metadata Katz-level protection, metadata 
should be protected under the Fourth Amendment. This would 
require the NSA to seek a warrant from FISC showing probable 
cause that the suspect is linked to terrorist activity. Requiring a 
higher standard for the Government to perform any search of 
metadata adequately balances the need for privacy in this 
252 Electronic Frontier Foundation, National Security Letters, EFF.ORG, 
https://www.eff.org/issues/national-security-letters (last visited Apr. 28, 2014). 
253 David Kravets, supra note 170. 
254 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (recognizing that the 
Fourth Amendment imposes a warrant requirement for searches and seizures 
because warrantless searches are unreasonable per se). 
255 USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, 120 
Stat. 196 § 106 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(A)) (Section 
215 does not show a requirement for a probable cause determination to be made 
and a warrant to be issued before searching the metadata). 
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enormous amount of sensitive information with the need to protect 
Americans from future terrorist threats. 
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